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Abstract 
 
People with schizophrenia who hallucinate show impairments in reality monitoring 
(the ability to distinguish internally generated information from information obtained 
from external sources) compared to non-hallucinating patients and healthy 
individuals. While this may be explained at least in part by an increased externalizing 
bias, it remains unclear whether this impairment is specific to reality monitoring, or 
whether it also reflects a general deficit in the monitoring of self-generated 
information (internal source monitoring). Much interest has focused recently on 
continuum models of psychosis which argue that hallucination-proneness is 
distributed in clinical and non-clinical groups, but few studies have directly 
investigated reality monitoring and internal source monitoring abilities in healthy 
individuals with a proneness to hallucinations. Two experiments are presented here: 
the first (N = 47, with participants selected for hallucination-proneness from a larger 
sample of 677 adults) found no evidence of an impairment or externalizing bias on a 
reality monitoring task in hallucination-prone individuals; the second (N = 124) found 
no evidence of atypical performance on an internal source monitoring task in 
hallucination-prone individuals. The significance of these findings is reviewed in light 
of the clinical evidence and the implications for models of hallucination generation 
discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), or the experience of hearing a voice in the 
absence of any speaker, are experienced by a large proportion of individuals with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, as well as those with other psychiatric diagnoses such as 
bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and by approximately 1% 
of the healthy population (Kråkvik et al., 2015). Cognitive and neuroscientific studies 
aimed at understanding the underlying mechanisms of AVH have compared task 
performance and/or neural activation between individuals with psychiatric diagnoses 
who hallucinate and those who do not (Stephane, Kuskowski, McClannahan, Surerus, 
& Nelson, 2010), as well as between groups of individuals with no clinical diagnoses 
who report differing levels of hallucination-proneness (Larøi, Van der Linden, & 
Marczewski, 2004). One of the most prominent cognitive models of AVH holds that 
these symptoms occur when internal mental events, such as inner speech, are 
misattributed to an external, non-self-generated source (Bentall, 1990; Frith, 1992; 
Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013). As such, research has focused on the 
question of how we typically distinguish between different sources of information, 
and how these processes might fail.  
 
The Source Monitoring Framework addresses how we make judgements about the 
origin (source) of remembered information, using characteristics such as perceptual, 
semantic, or affective content, or the nature of the earlier cognitive operations 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitoring can be broadly divided 
into three sub-categories depending on the contrasts which must be made: 1. External 
source monitoring, where the distinction is between non-self-generated sources of 
information, such as whether an image appeared on the left or right side of a screen; 
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2. Internal source monitoring, where a distinction must be made between self-
generated sources of information, such as whether a sentence had previously been 
spoken aloud or internally using inner speech; and 3. Reality monitoring, involving 
discrimination between internal and external sources of information, such as whether 
a sentence had been spoken by the individual or by someone else, or even whether an 
event had been witnessed or dreamt. Each of these variants are commonly tested 
using a source memory paradigm, requiring the participant to encode stimuli from 
different sources, and on later re-presentation of the stimuli, to judge the original 
source of the stimuli. For example, a reality monitoring task might present 
participants with a series of verbal word-pairs (e.g. bubble and squeak), which are 
shown either completed (‘perceived’, that is externally generated, e.g. bubble and 
squeak) or where the second word must be supplied by the participant (‘imagined’, 
that is, internally generated, e.g. bubble and s____). Reality monitoring ability might 
then be assessed by asking the participant to remember whether the second word of 
the word-pair had previously been perceived or imagined.  
 
Reality monitoring ability in healthy individuals is associated with activity in the 
medial anterior prefrontal cortex, (PFC, e.g. Simons, Henson, Gilbert, & Fletcher, 
2008; Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006; Turner, Simons, Gilbert, Frith, 
& Burgess, 2008), as well as to structural morphology of the nearby paracingulate 
sulcus (PCS; Buda, Fornito, Bergstrom, & Simons, 2011). Patients with schizophrenia 
show impairments in reality monitoring ability (e.g., Anselmetti et al., 2007; Brébion 
et al., 2000; Waters, Maybery, Badcock, & Michie, 2004), which are associated with 
dysfunction in the medial anterior PFC (Subramaniam et al., 2012; Vinogradov, Luks, 
Schulman, & Simpson, 2008), as well as to altered PCS morphology (Garrison, 
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Fernyhough, McCarthy-Jones, Haggard, & Simons, 2015). Indeed, Garrison et al 
(2015) indicated that a shorter PCS was associated with a higher likelihood of 
hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia, with these findings together suggesting 
that the PCS, and surrounding anterior medial PFC, may be associated with both 
reality monitoring and hallucinations. Considering the wider underlying network for 
AVH, an fMRI study with healthy individuals observed increased activation in the 
area surrounding the auditory cortices in the superior temporal gyrus (STG) during 
the encoding stage of a reality monitoring task, which correlated with measures of 
hallucination-proneness (Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson, 2014). Both 
the PCS and STG regions are often observed to be active during the experience of 
AVH in ‘symptom-capture’ fMRI studies (e.g. Zmigrod, Garrison, Carr, & Simons, 
2016).  
 
To test the suggestion that reality monitoring deficits play a causal role in the 
generation of AVH, research has focused on the behavioural association between 
atypical source monitoring and the presence or intensity of hallucinations. Two 
mechanisms have been proposed which might explain this deficit: an externalizing 
bias and a general source monitoring deficit. The idea of externalizing bias stems 
from the observation made during reality monitoring studies involving healthy 
individuals, that participants often exhibit a greater likelihood of falsely attributing 
new or internally generated items to an external source, than of making the reverse 
error (Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981; see Garrison, Bond, Gibbard, Johnson, & 
Simons, 2016, for a discussion). Bentall (1990) argued that since hallucinations are 
internally generated events experienced as external, atypical source monitoring in 
individuals with AVH is most likely to manifest itself as an enhanced externalizing 
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bias (in which self-generated information is more likely to be misattributed as 
externally-generated). Behavioral evidence supports this proposal, with a recent meta-
analysis finding that patients with hallucinations have a greater tendency to 
misattribute internal items to external sources than non-hallucinating individuals or 
healthy controls (Brookwell, Bentall, and Varese, 2013). 
 
An alternative possibility is that individuals with AVH exhibit general source 
monitoring deficits, which can be observed in terms of poorer performance across all 
types of source memory tasks. Such a deficit might arise in addition to an 
externalizing bias (e.g., the deficit might be explained by some variation in the 
application of criteria used to determine the internal/external nature of mental 
experience), or may itself be related to the generation of the bias (e.g., if the weak 
application of decision-making criteria generally has a greater impact on the 
recognition of self-generated status than of external status). Evidence suggests that as 
well as deficits in reality monitoring, patients with schizophrenia do often exhibit 
internal and external source memory deficits when compared to healthy controls 
(Achim & Weiss, 2008). Furthermore, the few studies which have compared source 
monitoring deficits in patients with and without hallucinations offer some support for 
an association between general source monitoring deficits and hallucinations (Franck 
et al., 2000; Gawęda, Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2013).  
 
Interpreting the results of such empirical comparisons between patients and healthy 
individuals can be affected by the confound of medication status, and by other factors. 
Continuum models of psychosis, which suggest that that experiences such as AVH are 
distributed throughout the general population, entail that studying non-clinical 
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individuals with a proneness to hallucinate can provide a useful model of clinical 
syndromes (van Os & Reininghaus, 2016). Based on this approach, a small number of 
studies have investigated whether individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis who 
report hallucinatory experiences exhibit the same bias and/or deficit in source 
monitoring that has been associated with patients with schizophrenia. This area 
remains under-researched – in their review, Brookwell et al. (2013) reported three 
source monitoring studies in non-clinical populations, only one of which has been 
published. Larøi et al. (2004) tested undergraduate students on a reality monitoring 
task, classifying participants according to their score on a self-report questionnaire, 
the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS). They found that high hallucination-
prone individuals were more likely to misattribute self-generated words as having 
been spoken by the experimenter than those in the low hallucination-prone group, 
whereas there was no difference between the groups in other errors, or in recognition 
memory for previously presented words. However, in contrast, one study published 
since the Brookwell et al. meta-analysis found no effect of non-clinical hallucination-
proneness on reality monitoring (Self/Experimenter discrimination; McKague, 
McAnally, Skovron, Bendall, & Jackson, 2012).  
 
It thus remains unclear whether the reality monitoring impairment observed in 
patients with schizophrenia who hallucinate is also present in non-clinical 
hallucination-prone samples. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no study has tested the 
relationship between hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical sample and 
performance on internal source monitoring tasks, which might support the presence of 
a generalised deficit in source monitoring in the generation of hallucinations. Here, 
we report data from two separate experiments conducted with individuals recruited 
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from two university populations, which investigated whether non-clinical 
hallucination-proneness is associated with impairments in source memory 
performance, and if so, whether this is explained by an externalizing bias and/or a 
general internal source monitoring deficit. Experiment 1 recruited participants who 
scored in the top or bottom quartiles of a version of the LSHS, and tested for an 
association between self-reported hallucination-proneness and reality monitoring 
performance. Experiment 2 tested for an association between hallucination-proneness 
and internal source monitoring performance (overt/covert speech judgements). The 
externalizing bias model of AVH would predict that, on the reality monitoring task, 
higher hallucination-proneness should be associated with a greater tendency towards 
incorrectly responding that words spoken by the participant were spoken by the 
experimenter, and that word-pairs which had been imagined should be judged to have 
been perceived. If such effects reflect an externalizing bias, they should be specific to 
the reality monitoring task, with no difference observed on the internal source 
monitoring task. Alternatively, a general source monitoring deficit account of AVH 
would predict that higher hallucination-proneness would be associated with lower 
overall performance on both the reality monitoring task and the internal source 
monitoring task. 
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2.  Experiment 1: Reality Monitoring  
 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1  Participants 
677 participants were recruited to an on-line questionnaire by email invitation from 
volunteer lists maintained at the Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute at 
Cambridge University, and the Department of Psychology, Durham University, and 
from advertisements in the Cambridge and Durham areas. There was no financial 
incentive to participate and ethical approval for the study was obtained from the 
University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. An individual’s 
proneness to auditory hallucinations was assessed using a modified version 
(Morrison, Wells, & Nothard, 2000) of the Predisposition to Auditory Hallucination 
subscale of the Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R, Bentall & Slade, 
1985; see Section 2.1.2). Individuals who had LSHS-R scores in the upper or lower 
quartile (High-LS, or Low-LS) indicating high or low proneness to auditory 
hallucinations were invited for testing using the reality monitoring task in the 
Department of Psychology at either the University of Cambridge or Durham 
University.  
 
Twenty-five individuals were tested in the High-LS group (number of females = 18; 
mean age = 19.8, SD = 2.8 years; mean LSHS-R score = 13.2, SD = 2.1), and 22 
individuals in the Low-LS group (number of females = 20; mean age = 22.9, SD = 7.5 
years; mean LSHS-R score = 2.1, SD = 1.4). Proneness to auditory hallucinations, as 
measured by the LSHS-R, differed significantly between these groups: t(45) = 20.973, 
p < .001. There were no significant differences between the groups in terms of age 
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(t(45) = 1.932, n.s.) or sex (2 = 2.703, n.s.), all participants reported being native 
English speakers, and no participants reported any hearing problems.  
 
2.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Self-report measures – The revised version of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale 
(LSHS-R), used to assess predisposition to hallucinatory experiences in the auditory 
modality, comprises five questions (e.g., I have had the experience of hearing a 
person’s voice and then found that no-one was there), with each item scored on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘almost always’ (4). Total scores 
can thus range from 0 – 20 with higher scores indicating a greater predisposition to 
auditory hallucinations. The original scale was modified by McCarthy-Jones and 
Fernyhough (2011) to remove a question with a low endorsement rate and improve 
internal reliability, and in testing was found to have satisfactory psychometric 
properties. 
 
Reality monitoring task – The task was adapted from one used previously (Simons, 
Henson, Gilbert, & Fletcher, 2008; Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006) 
and involved the initial presentation of word-pairs followed by a test phase. In the test 
phase, the participant was asked to indicate whether a word had earlier been presented 
within an intact word-pair using the response ‘Perceived’, or had been presented in a 
word-pair which had needed to be completed by imagining the missing word, with the 
response ‘Imagined’. Participants were also required to judge whether the word-pair 
had previously been spoken aloud by themselves (‘Subject’ response) or was spoken 
by the researcher (‘Experimenter’ response). Previously unstudied words were also 
used in the test phase, requiring a ‘New’ response. The stimuli consisted of 216 well-
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known word-pairs (e.g., ‘Laurel and Hardy’, ‘Bacon and Eggs’), which were pilot 
tested for the current study to ensure their familiarity among adults in the target 
demographic range. The task comprised 6 separate study and test blocks, with 24 
word-pair stimuli in each study phase (six word-pairs presented in four combinations 
of Subject/Experimenter × Perceived/Imagined conditions; Figure 1) and an 
additional 12 new words included in the test phase.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Each study trial commenced with a screen indicating whether the subject or 
experimenter should read aloud the word-pair. The word-pair was then shown, either 
complete (perceived trials) or with only the first letter of the second word provided 
such that the second word needed to be self-generated (imagined trials). In both cases 
the subject or experimenter then had three seconds to read aloud the entire word-pair, 
completing the word-pair as necessary for imagined trials. Each study phase was 
followed by its corresponding test phase, consisting of one sub-block for each of the 
two reality monitoring conditions. The sub-blocks commenced with a question screen 
indicating which condition was being tested, i.e. for the Perceived/Imagined 
condition: ‘Was the accompanying word Seen or Imagined or New?’, and for the 
Self/Experimenter condition: ‘Was the accompanying word said by Self or 
Researcher or New?’ These were then followed by a test screen containing the first 
word from one of the studied word-pairs, or a new word, together with the instruction 
to provide the appropriate response. Participants had 4 seconds to make their 
response. 
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The order of presentation of sub-blocks in the test phase alternated across the six full 
blocks of the task and was counterbalanced across participants. The word-pairs 
assigned to the Perceived/Imagined and Subject/Experimenter conditions, as well as 
new words, were also counterbalanced across participants, and the order of 
presentation of word-pairs was pseudo-randomized to ensure no run of more than 
three items of the same condition in any study or test phase. 
 
2.1.3  Data analysis 
Old/new recognition accuracy was calculated as the adjusted item recognition score 
(hits minus false alarms, with hits being defined as the proportion of words correctly 
recognised as previously seen and false alarms the proportion of new words 
incorrectly endorsed as old). Reality monitoring accuracy was calculated as the 
number of accurate source responses divided by the number of correct responses 
recognising an item as old.  
 
Misattribution errors were calculated for perceived and imagined trials as the number 
of responses made for the alternative reality monitoring response as a proportion of 
total errors made. So for example, ‘Imagined judged Perceived’ errors were calculated 
as the number of perceived responses that were made to imagined trials divided by the 
sum of perceived and new responses to imagined trials. This gives a measure of 
misattribution error unrelated to overall item recognition accuracy for each condition. 
The proportion of internalisation errors (Perceived judged Imagined, or Experimenter 
judged Subject) was then compared to the proportion of externalisation errors 
(Imagined judged Perceived or Subject judged Experimenter) for each participant, to 
give a measure of externalizing bias. Eight participants made no errors for one or 
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more of the study conditions for the Perceived/Imagined task (6 in the High-LS and 2 
in the Low-LS conditions) and 15 (8 in the High-LS and 7 in the Low-LS conditions) 
for the Subject/Experimenter task; these participants were excluded from the 
misattribution bias analysis only.  
 
Preliminary analyses confirmed the absence of significant effects of potentially 
confounding variables of participants’ age or sex on Old/New recognition, reality 
monitoring accuracy or externalizing bias, all Fs(1,44) < 3.291, n.s. 
 
2.2  Results  
There was no difference between the high and low hallucination proneness groups for 
Old/New memory, t(45) = .416, p = .679, d = .115, indicating that the groups had 
similar recognition memory ability (Table 1).  
 
To analyse the reality monitoring data, a mixed ANOVA with High-LS and Low-LS 
group as between-subjects factor, and the reality monitoring condition 
(Subject/Experimenter or Perceived/Imagined) as a within-subject factor, was 
conducted. There was a within subjects effect of task condition: F(1,45) = 64.479, p < 
.001, p2 = .589, indicating that both groups were better at judging whether a word-
pair had been spoken by the subject or experimenter, compared to distinguishing 
whether a word-pair had been perceived or imagined. However, there was no main 
effect of hallucination-proneness group, F(1,45) = .014, p = .905, p2 = .000, and no 
interaction between hallucination-proneness group and reality monitoring condition: 
F(1,45) = .460, p = .501, p2 = .010, thus giving no indication of an association 
between hallucination proneness and reality monitoring ability.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
To allow a direct comparison with the findings of the similar study by Larøi et al. 
(2004), the results of the Subject/Experimenter reality monitoring task were then 
broken down for trials which had been spoken by the subject or by the experimenter 
(Table 1). Contrary to the findings of the earlier study, a mixed ANOVA with 
Self/Experimenter accuracy as DV, group as factor and whether the word-pair had 
been spoken by the subject or experimenter (‘speaker’) as within-subjects variable, 
revealed that while both groups were better at the Self/Experimenter discrimination 
for word-pairs spoken by the Experimenter, F(1, 45) = 31.744, p < .001,  p2 = .414, 
there was no group difference in subjects’ ability to remember that they had 
previously spoken the word-pair, compared with their memory for experimenter 
spoken stimuli, i.e. no significant group × speaker interaction:  F(1, 45) = .649, p = 
.425,  p2 = .014.  
 
Finally, an analysis of errors was undertaken by calculating a misattribution error rate 
as a measure independent of reality monitoring accuracy, to give an indication of the 
proportion of errors that were ascribed to the alternate reality monitoring condition as 
opposed to a new item (Figure 2). A mixed ANOVA was undertaken for the analysis 
of errors on the Perceived/Imagined task, with the misattribution error rate as DV, 
group as factor, and two within-subject variables of whether the trials has been 
spoken by subject or experimenter, and whether the error direction was internalising 
(that is, Perceived judged Imagined) or externalising (that is, Imagined judged 
Perceived). The analysis revealed no significant group difference for the proportion of 
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misattribution errors made overall, F(1, 37) = 0.051, p = .823, p2 = .001, but with a 
consistent externalizing bias for both groups, as measured by a greater number of 
externalisation compared to internalisation errors for each condition: F(1, 37) = 
59.146, p < .001, p2 = .615. This externalising bias was not significantly different for 
items which had been spoken by the subject or the experimenter: F(1,37) = 1.276, p = 
.266, p2 = .033.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The analysis of variance of misattribution errors in the Perceived/Imagined tasks did 
reveal a marginal interaction between group and internal–external error direction, F(1, 
37) = 3.838, p = .058, p2 = .094, suggesting that participants in the High-LS group 
might have some tendency to make more externalizing errors than participants in the 
Low-LS group.  However, when this possibility was tested, there was found to be no 
overall difference between the groups in either the proportion of externalising errors, 
(I judged P: t(45) = -.995, p = .326, d = .291), or internalising errors, (P judged I: 
t(45) = .439, p = .663, d = .127). Furthermore, the absence of a three way, group × 
error direction × (spoken by subject or experimenter) condition interaction, F(1, 37) = 
.654, p = .424, p2 = .017, suggests that any such tendency was not associated with 
information that had been specifically generated by the subject, as opposed to by the 
experimenter.  
 
A similar analysis of variance undertaken for the Self/Experimenter task also revealed 
an externalizing bias for both groups: F(1, 30) = 42.594, p < .001, p2 = .587, 
suggesting that participants were more likely to ascribe a word-pair spoken by 
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themselves to the experimenter than they were a word-pair spoken by the 
experimenter to themselves. This was the case regardless of whether the stimulus had 
earlier been perceived or imagined at encoding: F(1, 30) = .274, p = .605, p2 = .009. 
There was no difference between the groups for the proportion of misattribution 
errors made, nor any other significant main effects or interactions, F(1,30) < 2.231, p 
> .146, p2 < .069.  
 
The analysis of misattribution errors across both reality monitoring conditions 
therefore gives no evidence of an enhanced externalising bias in individuals with a 
greater proneness to AVH.  
 
 
3.  Experiment 2: Internal source monitoring  
The second experiment used an internal source monitoring paradigm, requiring 
participants to either read a word-pair to themselves using inner speech (i.e., covert 
speech), or to read a word-pair aloud (overt speech). At a later point, participants were 
presented with each of the word-pairs again, and were required to recall whether each 
had been read silently or aloud. Given that this task required participants to make a 
decision between only two options (covert or overt speech) about each word-pair, the 
data was analyzed using signal detection theory to investigate both sensitivity and 
bias on the task. It was hypothesized that, if hallucination-proneness is associated 
with a general source monitoring deficit, there should be a significant positive 
correlation between LSHS-R score and internal source monitoring task performance 
(task sensitivity). 
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3.2.  Method 
3.1.1.  Participants 
The sample consisted of 125 participants from the staff and student population of 
Durham University, UK. One participant was excluded from further analysis because 
their task sensitivity (d') on the source monitoring task was < 0, indicating below 
chance performance, leaving a final sample size of 124 (number of females = 96, 
mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 2.5 years). Participants all reported being native English 
speakers, and no participants reported any hearing problems. Mean score on the 
LSHS-R was 8.75 (SD = 2.11). When participants were categorized into high and low 
hallucination-proneness groups, there was no difference in age or sex between groups 
(age:  t(42) = 1.32, p = .195; sex: 2 = 1.91, p = .167). The high hallucination-prone 
group scored significantly higher on the LSHS-R (M = 11.85, SD = 0.93) than the low 
hallucination-prone group (M = 5.61, SD = 0.61); t(42) = 25.06, p < .001. 
 
3.1.2. Design and Procedure 
The auditory items from the revised version of the LSHS-R were again used to assess 
hallucination-proneness (see Section 2.1.2), although in this experiment response 
options ranged from 1-4 for each question, with total scores thus able to range from 4 
- 20, compared with 0 – 20 in Experiment 1. This difference arose due to an error in 
the reporting of previous literature; McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough (2011) described 
their revised version of the LSHS as comprising questions with response options 0-4, 
which was the basis for the questionnaire used in Experiment 1. However, in a later 
corrigendum, McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough clarified that a 1-4 scale had actually 
been used, and this corrected version was adopted for our Experiment 2. Therefore, 
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although the questionnaires used in our two experiments consisted of exactly the same 
questions, the mean scores are not directly comparable. 
 
Internal source monitoring task – In contrast to the task used in Experiment 1, this 
source memory task, based loosely on that used by Franck et al. (2000), asked 
participants to distinguish between two internally generated sources: whether verbal 
stimuli were spoken aloud using overt speech, or said silently to themselves using 
covert (inner) speech. As with the reality monitoring task, there were two stages to the 
task, involving word-pair completion and subsequent recall. Participants were not 
informed that they would be asked to remember the word-pairs until immediately 
before the second stage of the task.  
 
In the word-pair completion stage, participants were presented with a series of 72 
word-pairs (for example, ‘gold and silver’), 36 of which they were instructed to say 
out loud (‘overt speech’ trials), and 36 of which they were instructed to say to 
themselves using inner speech (‘covert speech’ trials). To manipulate the extent to 
which the stimuli were self-generated, and in a similar way to the reality monitoring 
task in Experiment 1, within each condition, 18 word-pairs were fully presented to 
participants on-screen (e.g., ‘gold and silver’, viz. ‘perceived’ trials), while the 
remaining 18 were only partially completed (e.g., ‘gold and s_____’, viz. ‘imagined’ 
trials). For each trial, the participant was asked to say the full word-pair (overtly or 
covertly); thus, half of the trials required participants to produce the words themselves 
(imagined), whereas half required the participant to read the word-pair from the 
screen (perceived). The word-pairs were informally tested in a small pilot study, to 
ensure that they were familiar to the large majority of participants. Word-pairs were 
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counterbalanced across presentation mode (perceived or imagined) and condition 
(overt/covert). For each trial, the instruction (‘Out Loud’ or ‘Inner Speech’) appeared 
on the screen for 1250 ms, followed by the word-pair for 3250 ms, followed by an 
inter-trial interval of 750 ms. If the participant did not know the correct word to 
complete a pair, they were instructed to indicate this with a button press. 
 
After the first stage was completed, participants took a 15 minute break, during which 
they completed the LSHS-R, as well as various other self-report questionnaires 
relating to inner speech phenomenology (Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire; 
McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011), and anxiety and depression (Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). These measures were not intended 
to be linked to the source memory task, but were included in association with other 
task-based measures that were completed later in the testing session (to be reported 
elsewhere; Moseley et al., in preparation). After 15 minutes, participants were then 
asked to complete the memory test stage of the task, in which they were presented 
with the second part of each word-pair (e.g., ‘silver’), in a random order. Participants 
were asked to try to judge whether they had previously said each word out loud or 
using inner speech, responding with a button press. This test phase was self-timed 
with each word presented in the centre of the computer screen until a response was 
made. 
 
3.1.3. Data Analysis 
Signal detection measures were used to analyze data from the internal source 
monitoring task, as recommended by McKague et al. (2012). ‘Hits’ were classified as 
overtly spoken words correctly recalled as such, whilst false alarms were classified as 
covertly spoken words incorrectly recalled as overtly spoken. (‘Miss’ and ‘correct 
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rejection’ responses are not reported here, since they are, necessarily, directly 
proportional to hit and false alarm rates). d', a measure of task sensitivity, was 
calculated as the standardised hit rate (z-score of hit rate) minus the standardised false 
alarm rate (z-score of false alarm rate), with a lower value indicating less ability to 
distinguish the source of words. The second dependent variable was β, a measure of 
response bias, which was calculated as outlined by Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) 
(with a lower value indicating a lower criterion for deciding that a word was spoken 
aloud).  
 
In contrast to Experiment 1, where an initial group split on hallucination-proneness 
was used to invite participants for behavioural testing, all participants in Experiment 2 
completed both the LSHS-R self-report questionnaire and the internal source 
monitoring task. Therefore, we first computed correlations (Spearman’s rho) between 
proneness to auditory hallucinations and internal source monitoring performance 
(sensitivity and response bias, for the imagined and perceived conditions). To enable 
comparison with Experiment 1, we also split participants into high hallucination-
proneness (those scoring in the upper quartile on the LSHS-R; N = 26) and low 
hallucination-proneness (scoring in the lower quartile on the LSHS-R; N = 18) 
groups, and compared performance on the source monitoring task between these 
groups. There was a significant difference between the high and low groups in 
hallucination-proneness: t(42) = 25.06, p < .001, as expected. A 2 × 2 mixed model 
ANOVA with a between-subjects variable of hallucination-proneness group 
(high/low) and a within-subjects variable of task condition (imagined/perceived word-
pairs) was therefore conducted with both d' and β as dependent variables. 
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3.2. Results 
There were no significant correlations between proneness to auditory hallucinations 
and internal source monitoring performance for either of the conditions (perceived or 
imagined) of the internal source monitoring task, or for task performance overall, 
Spearman’s rho ≤ 0.124, all ps > .167. (see Table 2).   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
A 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA with task sensitivity (d') as the dependent variable 
(Table 3) showed a main effect of imagined/perceived status: F(1, 42) = 44.27, p < 
.001, p2 = .513; sensitivity was greater for imagined word-pairs (M = 1.68, SD = 
0.74) compared with those that had been perceived (M = 1.04, SD = 0.61). There was 
a marginal main effect of hallucination-proneness: F(1, 42) = 3.36, p = .074, p2 = 
.074. There was no significant interaction between task condition 
(Perceived/Imagined) and hallucination-proneness (high/low): F(1, 42) = 0.03, p = 
.862, p2 = .001. 
 
There was no difference in β between the task conditions, F(1, 42) = 1.10, p = .299, 
p2 = .026, or hallucination-proneness groups, F(1, 42) = .017,  p = .896, p2 < .001, 
and no significant interaction between task condition (Perceived/Imagined) and 
hallucination-proneness (high/low): F(1, 42) = 0.073, p = .788, p2 = .002. Thus, the 
experiment indicated no significant differences between hallucination-proneness 
groups on any measure of internal source monitoring. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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4. General Discussion 
The two experiments presented above addressed a key prediction of continuum 
models of psychosis: whether source monitoring impairments are associated with 
hallucination-proneness in the non-clinical population, as they are in people with 
clinical diagnoses who hallucinate. Experiment 1 found no difference in accuracy 
either for Old/New recognition, or for Perceived/Imagined or Subject/Experimenter 
reality monitoring judgments, with effect sizes so low (p2 ≤ .02) as to preclude a 
sample size explanation. While there was clear evidence of a general externalizing 
bias in both reality monitoring conditions, consistent with that previously reported 
from studies in the healthy population (Johnson et al., 1981), this was not found to be 
significantly enhanced in participants in the high hallucination-proneness group.  
 
A marginal interaction (p = .058) between group and internal–external error direction 
in the Perceived/Imagined reality monitoring task suggested that there might be a 
tendency for high hallucination-prone individuals to judge a greater proportion of 
imagined word-pairs as perceived than perceived words as imagined. However, this 
possibility was not supported by analysis of the simple effects, and if such a tendency 
is related to auditory hallucinations, then it might be expected to be specific to items 
that were generated by the subject, which was not found to be the case. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence of an enhanced externalizing bias in the Subject/Experimenter 
reality monitoring task for the high hallucination-prone group compared to the low 
hallucination-prone group.  
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The results from Experiment 1 were supported by the findings of Experiment 2, 
which investigated participants’ ability to discriminate between whether they had 
overtly or covertly spoken a word-pair, which had been either perceived or imagined 
during the encoding phase. No significant correlations were found between task 
sensitivity or response bias and hallucination-proneness, regardless of whether the 
stimuli had previously been perceived or imagined. Furthermore, no differences were 
detected in task sensitivity and response bias between groups of participants split by 
hallucination-proneness as in Experiment 1. There was a marginal reduction in overall 
task sensitivity for the higher hallucination-proneness group (p = .074), but this was 
not supported by a significant correlation between task sensitivity and hallucination-
proneness score across the entire sample. Indeed, the correlation effect sizes were so 
small (rho ≤ 0.124) that statistical power is again unlikely to be an explanation, and 
there was no interaction for task sensitivity between LSHS-R group and the perceived 
or imagined status of the stimuli, as might be expected if the deficit related to the 
inability to distinguish the source of imagined information from that which had been 
perceived.  
 
The results of these two experiments thus offer little or no support for a deficit in 
source monitoring ability, and/or of enhanced externalizing biases in hallucination-
prone individuals in the healthy population. These findings contrast with the findings 
of behavioral and neuroimaging studies in patients with schizophrenia, which report 
associations between reality monitoring impairment and the presence of AVH. Indeed 
we have demonstrated reality monitoring impairment and dysfunction in the medial 
anterior PFC in patients with schizophrenia using a very similar version of the task to 
that used in Experiment 1 (Garrison et al, in revision). As such, the results are 
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inconsistent with continuum models of psychosis (van Os & Reininghaus, 2016), 
which assert that hallucinations are distributed throughout the general population, and 
thus which predict comparable effects in healthy individuals who are prone to 
hallucinations as in patients with schizophrenia who hallucinate.  However, there are 
a number of alternative possible explanations for the apparent discrepancy in findings 
relating to the association between source monitoring impairment and AVH in clinical 
and non-clinical groups.  
 
Firstly, it is possible that the assessment of hallucination-proneness used in the 
present experiments was ineffective in measuring individuals’ proneness to AVH in 
the non-clinical population. However, while the revised Launay-Slade Hallucination 
scale (LSHS-R) comprises only five questions which ask about unusual auditory 
experiences, the scale in its revised form has been well tested and found to have 
satisfactory psychometric properties (see McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011). 
 
Alternatively, there may be only some shared overlap of the mechanisms involved in 
clinical and non-clinical hallucinatory experiences (as suggested by Badcock & 
Hugdahl, 2012), which might be especially true for the hallucinatory experiences 
reported by the samples employed here. Larøi (2012) proposed a (fuzzy) distinction 
between participants in studies of non-clinical hallucinations research, referring to 
these as Type i non-patients and Type ii non-patients. Participants recruited in the 
current two experiments would be classed as Type i non-patients, who typically report 
infrequent hallucinatory experiences that may be phenomenologically distinct from 
the AVH reported by patients (e.g., brief experiences that rarely take the form of 
complex utterances). In contrast, Type ii non-patients often report relatively frequent 
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hallucinations that are phenomenologically more similar to the AVH reported by 
patients, except in terms of emotional valence and perceived controllability (Johns et 
al., 2014). Thus, a reality monitoring impairment may not be involved in the 
hallucinatory experiences reported by Type i non-patients, but may be involved in the 
‘full blown’ AVH reported by Type ii non-patients as well as by patients.  
 
A further question relates to how reality monitoring impairment might be implicated 
in the generation of hallucinations. Reality monitoring is defined as a mnemonic 
ability, but the cognitive operations involved in monitoring the origin of retrieved 
information might overlap with those that monitor the origin of real time information 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; discussed in Garrison et al. 2016), with impairments in these 
operations leading to the generation of hallucinations. However, other mechanisms 
have been proposed to explain the failure to correctly identify the origin of self-
generated information, which might manifest differently across different groups of 
individuals. For example, AVH may arise from enhanced perceptual content of self-
generated auditory information due to over-activation of secondary association speech 
and language cortices, such as the voice-selective auditory regions in the STG (Allen 
et al., 2008). If activation of these brain areas results in unusually vivid internal 
auditory imagery, such information could be erroneously recognised as external in 
origin, without any deficit in normal source monitoring activity. Consistent with this 
suggestion, speech and language areas are active in addition to anterior regions such 
as cingulate cortices during hallucinations (Zmigrod et al., 2016), and a neuroimaging 
study in healthy individuals indicated the presence of intermittent episodes of 
significantly increased activity in bilateral primary and secondary auditory cortices, 
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together with associated activations in the anterior cingulate cortex, even during 
periods of silence (Hunter et al., 2006).  
 
Alternatively, there may be a distinct impairment in the self-monitoring processes 
which predict the sensory consequences of actions through comparator forward 
modelling/efference copy mechanisms (Feinberg, 1978). Self-monitoring accounts of 
reality testing suggest that AVH arise from a disruption in the capacity to monitor the 
intention to produce inner speech (or other cognitions), resulting in it being 
erroneously marked as external (Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004). Such accounts 
thus provide an explanation for the external directionality of errors without the need 
for any deficit in a separate source monitoring process, as information is assumed to 
be externally perceived in the absence of an efference copy signal. However, while 
there is strong evidence for self-recognition deficits in patients with schizophrenia 
relating to motor action (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000), and some support 
for corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia (Ford et al., 2001; Ford & 
Mathalon, 2004), direct evidence for a specific comparator model relating to 
inner/covert speech or auditory imagery is lacking. Furthermore, theoretical 
arguments have been raised against the idea that the generation of thought has the 
same physiological consequences as that of motor action, with Gallagher (2004) 
arguing that the self-monitoring account of hallucinations fails in applying an 
explanation of motor function to one of cognitive experience.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the findings of the reality monitoring study in 
Experiment 1 are in contrast to those of Larøi et al. (2004), who reported significant 
differences between low and high hallucination-prone healthy individuals in the 
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accuracy of self-generated, but not experimenter-generated, stimuli. The discrepancy 
appears not to be explained by the use of non-parametric statistics to analyze the 
results in the Larøi et al. study, as similar non-parametric analysis of our experiments 
did not alter our findings. What is clear, however, is that the investigation of reality 
monitoring and source monitoring deficits in clinical studies has also produced a 
range of varying results (see Brookwell et al., 2013). These might be explained by a 
wide variation in task design, with some tasks using verbal stimuli and others using 
performed or perceived actions, and with some tasks using only the Self/Experimenter 
or the Perceived/Imagined discriminations separately. This may be the explanation for 
the discrepancy in findings with the Larøi et al study, which used a Self/Experimenter 
paradigm but with stimuli varying in emotional valence and cognitive effort.  
Furthermore, Larøi et al. used a version of the LSHS consisting of 16 questions, many 
of which seem only indirectly related to hallucination-proneness (e.g., “I have had a 
sensation of floating or falling, or that I left my body temporarily”). In contrast, the 
present study focused solely on auditory hallucinations. Using the same task across 
clinical and non-clinical groups, together with tighter control of confounding 
variables such as participants’ age, language skills or the presence of general memory 
deficits, should help address variation across studies going forward.   
 
We remain a long way from understanding the brain mechanisms underpinning 
hallucinations, with many existing theoretical models of AVH failing to address the 
complexity and diversity of hallucinations (for example, their differing developmental 
trajectories, or complex interactions with the individual). Understanding whether a 
single theoretical model can be applied to clinical and non-clinical hallucinations will 
depend on the flexibility of the framework to account for how factors implicated in 
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the generation of these perceptual anomalies might interact to explain differences in 
phenomenological experience between groups, as well as the variety in experience for 
a single individual. If such a framework can be developed, this would map most 
closely to quasi-dimensional models of schizotypy (Yung et al., 2005), which allow 
for discontinuities in the experience of psychosis across the population consistent with 
separable phenotypic expressions of associated factors (Meehl, 1989; 1962), rather 
than a fully-dimensional model (Claridge, 1972, 1994) more supportive of an 
unbroken continuum. Although the work in the present study does not support the role 
of reality-monitoring ability as a factor in non-clinical hallucination-proneness, this 
does not rule out more complex models invoking reality monitoring as an important 
factor in the transition between hallucination-proneness and more frequent 
hallucinatory experiences, in clinical or non-clinical populations. 
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SMT measure Spearman's rho
d' (overall) -0.114
β (overall) 0.001
d' (imagined -0.076
β (imagined) 0.010
d' (perceived) -0.124
β (perceived) -0.001
Low-LS High-LS
Accuracy variable M (SD) M (SD) t statistic (df = 45) p
Old/New recognition .85 (.11) .86 (.05) -0.416 .68
Perceived/Imagined reality monitoring .85 (.07) .84 (.08) 0.385 .70
Self/Experimenter reality monitoring .92 (.05) .93 (.05) -0.319 .75
Self/Experimenter: Self generated .88	(.08) .90	(.08) -0.583 .56
Self/Experimenter: Experimenter generated .96	(.04) .96	(.03) 0.509 .62
Table 1.  Old/new recognition and reality monitoring accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: To aid comparison with the findings of Larøi et al., (2004) the results of the 
Self/Experimenter reality monitoring task were further broken down for trials which 
had been spoken by the subject or experimenter.  
 
 
 
Table 2.  Correlations between internal source monitoring task performance and 
auditory hallucination-proneness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: d' = task sensitivity; β = task response bias. Higher d' measures correspond to greater 
ability to distinguish between overtly and covertly spoken words. Higher β values correspond 
to a more conservative criterion for deciding a word was spoken overtly. None of the 
correlations were significant at p < .05, even before correction for multiple comparisons.  
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Source monitoring measure Low High
d' (imagined) 1.88 (0.69) 1.61 (0.66)
d' (perceived) 1.16 (0.67) 0.85 (0.53)
β (imagined) 1.58 (1.14) 1.62 (1.36)
β (perceived) 1.93 (1.32) 1.83 (1.08)
Hallucination-proneness
 
Table 3. Group performance on the internal source monitoring task.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: d' = task sensitivity; β = task response bias. Measures shown are mean scores, with SD 
in parentheses.  
 
 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in the Reality Monitoring Tasks 
Note: Sample stimuli used in the study phase (left) and test phase (right) of the reality 
monitoring task. In a 2 × 2 design, either the subject or experimenter spoke aloud the stimuli, 
which were presented either complete (perceived) or incomplete (requiring the second word 
to be imagined). Subjects were then presented at test with the first word of a word pair, and 
asked to judge whether the accompanying word had been seen or imagined, or if the 
presented word was new; or whether the subject or experimenter had read aloud the word 
pair, or the presented word was new. 
 
 
Figure 2. Misattribution errors  
Note: The two charts refer to items misclassified for each of the reality monitoring tasks, 
broken down by the trial conditions. So for example, the first two bars in the left chart refer to 
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items which had been imagined by the subject, which were then incorrectly judged as 
perceived (an externalisation error), and the last two bars in the right chart to items which had 
been imagined by the experimenter during encoding, but which the subject had later judged to 
have been self-imagined (an internalisation error).  
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
